Towards a more effective climate policy on international trade by Dietzenbacher, Erik et al.
ARTICLE
Towards a more effective climate policy on
international trade
Erik Dietzenbacher 1✉, Ignacio Cazcarro 2,3 & Iñaki Arto 3
In the literature on the attribution of responsibilities for greenhouse gas emissions, two
accounting methods have been widely discussed: production-based accounting (PBA) and
consumption-based accounting (CBA). It has been argued that an accounting framework for
attributing responsibilities should credit actions contributing to reduce global emissions and
should penalize actions increasing them. Neither PBA nor CBA satisfy this principle. Adapting
classical Ricardian trade theory, we consider ex post measurement and propose a scheme for
assigning credits and penalties. Their size is determined by how much CO2 emissions are
saved globally due to trade. This leads to the emission responsibility allotment (ERA) for
assigning responsibilities. We illustrate the differences between ERA and PBA and CBA by
comparing their results for 41 countries and regions between 1995–2009. The Paris
Agreement (COP21) proposed new market mechanisms; we argue that ERA is well suited to
measure and evaluate their overall mitigation impact.
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Two main accounting methods are used in the literature todetermine countries’ contribution to global emissions orenvironmental problems. The production-based account-
ing (PBA) measures the amount of, e.g., CO2 released to the
atmosphere by the industries and households of a country. The
consumption-based accounting (CBA) attributes emissions to the
country’s consumption of final products. CBA redistributes the
emissions from PBA and considers that emissions in another
country are necessary for the home country’s consumption
bundle. Foreign emissions are embodied in the intermediate
inputs necessary to produce the home country’s consumption
goods and in the final goods directly imported by the home
country’s consumers. The home country is said to import foreign
emissions.
PBA and CBA are used to assign responsibility for global
environmental problems, such as climate change to countries.
Producer responsibility addresses the countries that directly
generate the pressure based on PBA. Consumer responsibility
addresses the countries that ultimately drive the pressure.
Another possibility is to share producer and consumer respon-
sibility1–3. Also the historical responsibility has emerged in cli-
mate negotiations, leaving developing countries better positioned
in negotiations if the time frame is shifted backward to the pre-
industrial time. Theoretically speaking, historical trade-adjusted
emissions accounts could be developed. In practice, however,
there are enormous data challenges and methodological issues.
Trade-adjusted accounts have been made only for the last three
decades. An increasing number of authors have examined the
nexus of producer–consumer responsibility, often dealing with
how to assign responsibility for internationally traded greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions.
It seems an obvious step to use PBA and CBA for designing a
scheme of credits and penalties to guide policy actions. Kander
et al.4 rightfully stated that “actions that contribute to reduced
global emissions should be credited, and actions that increase
them should be penalized.” However, neither PBA nor CBA
satisfy this principle. The discussion on carbon leakage and pol-
lution havens shows that PBA cannot be used for valuing coun-
tries’ contributions to global emission reduction. A country may
decide to import a product from abroad where it is produced
more emission-intensively than at home. In this case, global
emissions increase but the home country is rewarded because its
PBA decreases. CBA fails to credit countries for cleaning up their
export industries4. In this case, global emissions decrease but the
country is not rewarded because its CBA does not decrease.
Kander et al.4 adapt CBA and propose technology-adjusted
CBA (TCBA) to remedy this weakness and Domingos et al.5
propose TCBA* as a further adaptation. However, as the example
in Supplementary Note 2 of the Supplementary Information (SI)
shows, also TCBA and TCBA* may penalize a country to engage
in trade that reduces global emissions (even to a larger extent
than does CBA). The reason is that they do not fully account for
the second weakness of CBA mentioned by Kander et al.4: “CBA
fails to encourage certain kinds of specialization and trade that
might contribute to a more carbon-efficient use of global pro-
duction resources”.
We argue that ex post emission accounting is one thing, but
providing ex ante incentives to engage in a certain type of trade is
another. We link classical Ricardian trade theory to environ-
mental concerns, yielding a variant where countries should export
what they produce most clean. Standard emission multipliers
indicate ex ante where consumers should buy their products to
reduce global emissions. Using this information, ex post
accounting indicates how a country performs compared to other
countries (or the world average). This yields a scheme of credits
and penalties. A credit quantifies whether (and to what extent) a
country has reduced—through its trade—global emissions more
than the average country did. Adapting CBA with the credits and
penalties results in emission responsibility allotments (ERAs).
The size of the credits and penalties is determined by CO2
emissions saved globally due to the trade of this country (when
compared to the savings achieved by the average country). They
satisfy the properties of sensitivity (i.e., credits and penalties are
responsive to factors that a country can influence), additivity (i.e.,
global emissions are the sum of all national emissions), and
monotonicity (i.e., if the actions of country A reduce global
emissions more than average and more than the actions of
country B do, country A should be credited and more than
country B). These three properties were identified as desired
properties by Kander et al.4 and included in the larger set of
desired properties in Rodrigues et al.6 and Domingos et al.5. In
summary, PBA and CBA do not meet the properties described in
the above literature, nor do TCBA and TCBA* (which adapt
CBA). We also adapt CBA with credits and penalties, and pro-
pose ERA as a simple method to account for responsibilities.
ERA can be a powerful tool to track and assess how successful
countries can reduce global emissions through changing their
production, consumption or trade patterns. Several voices stres-
sed the relevance of having key indicators to track the progress of
individual and collective contributions in the context of the Paris
Agreement (COP21)7–10. ERA can serve to track joint actions
comprehensively and over time. This information can be useful in
periodical global stocktaking11. Main sources of information to
evaluate this progress are the national emissions inventories,
which follow PBA. However, as indicated in the COP21, any
comprehensive assessment should look into the global effects of
reductions of emissions. Moreover, the Agreement (article 6) also
provided the opportunity to use internationally transferred
mitigation outcomes (ITMOs). These are thought to be imple-
mented mainly bilaterally, where country A pays money to
country B for the emission reductions carried out in B and
attributed to A. The ITMOs require a robust accounting
system and should be guided by the fundamental principles of
ensuring environmental integrity and avoiding double
counting12,13, which align with the ERA approach.
Applying our method to the World Input–Output Database
(WIOD)14, we find that the ERAs are very close to the CBA
outcomes. This implies that the credits and penalties are generally
small, which means that most countries perform very similar
when it comes to reducing global emissions through trade.
Nevertheless, if ERA were adopted, rich countries would on
average receive credits for their trade and poor countries pay
penalties. The most remarkable outcomes for separate countries
are the large penalties for the USA and China, which is primarily
caused by trade between these two countries.
Results
Application to the WIOD. In this section, we present the results
for ERA (and compare them with those for other methods). The
discussion section comments on the method, results, and the
opportunities to use ERA for climate change policies. For the
empirical application, we use WIOD14 and the corresponding
emissions data from the environmental satellite accounts15. These
accounts give the CO2 emissions from human sources (i.e., not all
anthropogenic CO2). The main text focuses on CO2 emissions
(including CO2 emitted directly by households), the SI provides
additional results for CO2, CH4, and N2O in CO2 equivalents.
The environmental accounts in WIOD are consistent with the
input–output (IO) data. That is, they apply the residence
principle where emissions of a resident (no matter whether she
is physically present in the territory) are allocated to the territory
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of residence. This is different from the territorial principle
underlying energy balances and emissions inventories. The
territorial principle allocates emissions to the country in which
they physically take place, regardless of whether they are
undertaken by residents or non-residents15. There are 41
countries (including the Rest of the World, RoW) in WIOD,
each with 35 industries. The countries are: 27 countries of the EU,
Australia (AUS), Brazil (BRA), Canada (CAN), China (CHN),
India (IND), Indonesia (IDN), Japan (JPN), Korea (KOR),
Mexico (MEX), Russia (RUS), Taiwan (TWN), Turkey (TUR),
the USA, and RoW.
In Fig. 1, we compare ERA with PBA, CBA, and TCBA (all for
CO2 emissions) for the EU27, the USA, China, and Brazil.
Supplementary Table 1 in the SI presents the results for PBA,
CBA, TCBA, TCBA* (which corrects the TCBA)5,16, and ERA for
1995–2009 for all 41 countries individually. Supplementary
Table 2 does so for emissions of CO2, CH4, and N2O.
The most striking finding is that the ERAs are very close to the
CBA. This means that the credits or penalties of countries are in
general very small. A small credit for country R means that its
trade relations reduce global emissions only slightly more than do
trade relations on average. This implies that, all in all, countries
behave rather similar and there are no clear heroes and antiheroes
in terms of trade that reduces global emissions.
Of course, some countries will certainly be heroes (and some
other countries anti-heroes) of cleaner production. This could be
the case, for example, because they have installed technologies
with low emission intensities. The countries are then rewarded for
their actions by lower PBAs and CBAs. ERAs adapt CBAs by
looking at extra credits that can be gained only if a country trades
the appropriate goods with the right partner. However, the
questions what to trade and with whom to trade are in real
economic life still answered on the basis of profitability and not of
environmental considerations. This implies that few credits are
gained from trade, which may explain why we find ERAs so close
to the CBA. At the same time, if countries do not use
environmental considerations when deciding on trade, there is
a huge opportunity to gain many credits for the first countries
that decide to follow the principles of what might be termed green
Ricardian trade.
Credits and penalties. Let the scalar ERAR (CBAR) denote the
ERA (CBA) of country R, then the credits/penalties are obtained
from ERAR – CBAR. A negative difference ðERAR  CBAR < 0Þ
indicates a credit and a positive difference a penalty. Note that the
sum of credits and penalties equals zero, i.e.,P
RðERAR  CBARÞ ¼ 0. This implies that the credits/penalties
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Fig. 1 A comparison of emission accounting methods. Each graph gives the results when applying production-based accounting (PBA, black),
consumption-based accounting (CBA, dashed blue), technology-adjusted CBA (TCBA, orange), and emission responsibility allotment (ERA, purple). The
graphs are given for the EU27 a, the USA b, China c, and Brazil d, and give GHG emissions in Gt CO2 equivalents.
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may be blown up and multiplied by a factor 2, 5, 10, or any
number, based on policy decisions. Therefore, we stress the dif-
ference between an accounting framework (like CBA or PBA,
which are positive in nature) and a scheme of credits/penalties
(like ERA, which is normative, but based on positive information
about the reduction in global emissions). Although differences
between ERAR and CBAR are very small in Fig. 1, their sign is still
relevant because it remains the same if credits/penalties are blown
up. The results show that for the EU27 ERA lies below CBA
(implying small credits), while for the USA and China ERA lies
above CBA (implying penalties).
Next, we consider (for each country) ERAR − CBAR in the year
2009. Recall that a negative outcome implies a credit for this
country and a positive outcome implies a penalty. Countries are
ranked according to gross domestic product (GDP) per capita
and split into the 20 richest regions and the 20 poorest regions
(Cyprus ranks at place 21 and has the median GDP per capita).
The results in Table 1 show that the richest countries (with a
total credit of 35 megatonnes of CO2, Mt CO2) trade better (i.e.,
in general with higher credits) than the poorest countries (with a
penalty of 39 Mt). It is also clear that the results are dominated by
the very large penalties for China (129 Mt CO2) and the USA (72
Mt CO2). Consequently, most remaining rich countries (all 20
except the USA) still trade better than most remaining poor (all
20 except China), but the gap between rich and poor has nearly
vanished (total credits of 107 and 90 Mt CO2), and almost all
perform better than the average. Countries with large credits are
Russia (49 Mt CO2), Germany (31), RoW (31), and Italy (17); a
large penalty is for India (29 Mt CO2).
Clearly, these results partly reflect size. In terms of a country’s
achievements, it may be better to consider the relative credits and
penalties (as percentage of the CBA). Small countries trade very
well: Luxemburg (with a credit that is 46% of its CBA), Cyprus
(35%), Ireland (16%), and Denmark (13%). The EU27 consists of
many small countries that trade a lot with each other. The group
of 22 smaller EU countries (EU27, except the larger countries
Germany, France, UK, Italy, and Spain) has a credit of 101 Mt of
CO2 (which is 7% of its CBA) and 37 Mt is due to trade within
the group.
The most remarkable finding are the large penalties for the
USA and China. Supplementary Table 3 in the SI gives the credits
and penalties (i.e., ERA minus CBA) at the bilateral level. By far
the largest outcome in size is the penalty of 61 Mt of CO2 for the
trade between the USA and China. The major contributor to this
penalty is electrical and optical equipment (industry c14). Trade
between China and the USA regarding the final products of this
industry causes 36 Mt of the penalty. Other industries that
contributed substantially are textiles and textile products (6 Mt
CO2), machinery Nec (5 Mt CO2), and manufacturing Nec (4 Mt
CO2). In 1995–2009, trade among the two countries grew more
than six times on a nominal basis. A trade war between these
countries, where imports from each other are not allowed, would
have at least been beneficial for the global CO2 emissions in 2009.
The differences between 1995 and 2009 are summarized in
Table 2. In 1995, most of the countries (28 out of 40) had a
penalty and more poor countries than rich countries (according
to the 2009 GDP per capita) had a penalty (and thus more rich
than poor countries a credit). The situation in 2009 was reversed
Table 1 Differences between ERA and CBA (in Mt CO2, 2009).
20 Richest countries* (by
GDP pc)
ERAR  CBAR As % of CBAR 20 Poorest countries* (by
GDP pc)
ERAR  CBAR As % of CBAR
LUX −3.68 −46% CZE −3.66 −4%
USA 71.58 1% KOR −4.35 −1%
IRL −9.44 −16% MLT −3.30 −93%
NLD −2.89 −1% PRT −4.19 −6%
CAN 6.38 1% SVN −3.90 −19%
AUT −4.96 −5% EST −3.84 −31%
SWE −6.80 −8% HUN −3.92 −7%
AUS 3.51 1% LVA −3.13 −29%
BEL −2.97 −2% LTU −3.49 −18%
DNK −8.35 −13% POL −3.04 −1%
FIN −5.29 −8% RUS −49.15 −4%
GBR −5.48 −1% MEX 2.82 1%
GER −31.05 −3% BGR −4.00 −11%
SPA −1.65 0% ROM −3.58 −4%
JPN 3.61 0% TUR 1.02 0%
FRA −8.73 −2% RoW −30.53 −1%
GRC −9.24 −7% BRA −0.37 0%
TWN 0.23 0% CHN 129.17 2%
ITA −16.62 −3% IDN 2.06 1%
SVK −3.34 −9% IND 28.53 2%
CYP −3.96 −35%
Total richest 20 −35.18 −0.3% Total poorest 20 39.14 0.2%
Total except USA −106.76 −1.6% Total except China −90.02 −0.8%
*Both columns rank the countries from richest to poorest. Credits are negative and penalties are positive, the USA and China have the largest penalties. CYP has the median GDP per capita and is
therefore excluded from both top 20 lists (richest or poorest).
Table 2 Summary of credits and penalties in 1995 and 2009
(in Mt CO2).
1995 2009
Rich Poor Rich Poor
Credit ERAR  CBAR < 0  9 3 15 15
Penalty ERAR  CBAR > 0  11 17 5 5
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(more credits than penalties) and balanced (the numbers of rich
and poor countries receiving a credit—or penalty—were the
same).
Trade in emissions. Figure 2 visualizes the trade in emissions in
terms of ERAs, which allows to examine who emits for whom. It
gives the exports of emissions (following the CBA approach at the
bilateral level) that is corrected with the penalty or credit for each
pair of countries. Because the differences between ERA and CBA
are fairly small (as follows from Supplementary Table 3 in the SI),
the circos graph with CBA-based exports and import of emissions
looks very similar. The center of the graph gives the flows, the five
ribbons around the center provide the same information in a
different way (as explained in the note to Fig. 2). In order to be
able to focus on the flows that really matter, we aggregate the EU5
(Germany, UK, Italy, France, and Spain), and the non-presented
countries from WIOD in the RoW.
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Fig. 2 Circos graph with CO2 ERAs (in Mt CO2) by origin and destination. This graph distinguishes five regions as origin and destination. These are: USA
(the pink country); China (the red country); the EU15 (the yellow region); the Rest of WIOD countries (aggregate of 22 countries in WIOD, the green
region); and the rest of the world (RoW) in WIOD (the blue region). The explanation is given by the items A–F. A: Export of emissions (in Mt CO2) from
China (the red country) to RoW (the blue region), after correcting for the penalty that China and RoW receive because their bilateral trade contributes less
to global emission reduction than the average bilateral trade. B: The inner most ribbon gives the color of the importing country, for example blue because
RoW is the destination. C: The second ribbon gives the color of the exporting country. D: The third ribbon also gives the exports of emissions (in Mt CO2)
split according to destination countries/regions. E: The fourth ribbon gives the imports (in Mt CO2) split according to origin. F: The outer ribbon gives the
share of the exports that each destination receives.
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The flows have the color of the exporting country. A large flow
is 182 Mt CO2 for the exports of Chinese emissions (in red) to
RoW. This includes the 18 Mt penalty for trade between China
and RoW. Other large flows involving single countries are: from
China to USA (263 Mt CO2), from China to EU5 (141 Mt CO2),
and from RoW to USA (133 Mt CO2, colored in blue). Clearly,
China is a net exporter, and the USA and EU5 net importers.
Supplementary Fig. 1 in the SI gives the graph for a larger number
of countries, and Supplementary Fig. 2 also for emissions of CO2,
CH4, and N2O.
Countries and industries. Figure 3 is a tree map of ERA results
by selected countries and industries in 2009. Countries are
ordered from left to right and from top to bottom according to
their ERAs. Each country has a different color and the size of the
rectangle for country R reflects ERAR. Within each country, the
contributions by each industry are ordered from Northwest to
Southeast according to the contribution size (ERARi as given in
subsection 1.5 of Supplementary Note 1 of the SI). It measures the
global emissions embodied in country R’s consumption of final
product i (irrespective of the origin) corrected with a credit/
penalty for country R’s trade in product i. In Fig. 3, we present the
five largest economies in the EU separately (France, Germany,
Italy, Spain, and the UK) and aggregated the results for the
remaining 22 EU countries as Rest of the EU (RoEU).
The role of separate countries and groups of countries becomes
immediately clear. China, the USA, and the RoW are of
comparable size and together responsible for 60% of global
emissions. China (20%) and the USA (18%) are the largest
players, and contribute each as much as the ~150 (largely
developing) countries aggregated in the RoW (21%). The
industries that contribute the most are similar across countries.
These are: construction (c18, first for China, RoW, and India,
third for USA); electricity, gas, and water supply (c17, first for
USA and the main EU countries, second for RoW and India,
while of lesser importance for China), public admin and defence
(c31, second for USA and RoW, sixth for China, while of
relatively low importance in India), health and social work (c33,
fourth for USA, fifth for China, and sixth for RoW), and food,
beverages, and tobacco (c3, third for India, fourth for RoW, fifth
for USA, and eighth for China).
Supplementary Table 4 in the SI gives the major differences
between ERA and CBA in 2009. A positive difference indicates a
penalty. It means that trade of final product i by country R
increased global emissions more (or reduced them less) than
trade of final product i increased (decreased) global emissions on
average. China’s trade for the industry electrical and optical
equipment (c14, which ranked third in total ERA value, see Fig. 3)
led to an enormous penalty of 68 Mt CO2 (about half of the
country’s overall penalty of 129 Mt CO2). It indicates that China’s
AUS BRA CAN CHN ESP FRA GBR DEU IDN IND ITA JPN KOR MEX RoW RUS TUR TWN USA RoEU
Fig. 3 Tree map of ERAs in 2009 by selected country and industry. Each rectangle reflects the size of the ERA in a particular industry in a certain country.
For example, the upper left rectangle gives the ERA for the construction industry in China. Going from top to bottom and from left to right, the ERAs
become smaller. The countries are: Australia (AUS); Brazil (BRA); Canada (CAN); China (CHN); France (FRA); Great Britain (GBR); Germany (DEU);
Indonesia (IDN); India (IND); Italy (ITA); Japan (JPN); Korea (KOR); Mexico (MEX); Rest of the EU (RoEU, an aggregate of the 22 remaining EU countries
in WIOD); Rest of the World in WIOD (RoW); Russia (RUS); Spain (ESP); Turkey (TUR); Taiwan (TWN); and the USA. The industries are classified as
follows. c1: agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing; c2: mining and quarrying; c3: food, beverages, and tobacco; c4: textiles and textile products; c5:
leather, leather, and footwear; c6: wood, and products of wood and cork; c7: pulp, paper, printing, and publishing; c8: coke, refined petroleum, and nuclear
fuel; c9: chemicals and chemical products; c10: rubber and plastics; c11: other non-metallic mineral; c12: basic metals and fabricated metal; c13: machinery,
Nec.; c14: electrical and optical equipment; c15: transport equipment; c16: manufacturing, Nec.; recycling; c17: electricity, gas, and water supply; c18:
construction; c19: sale, maintenance, and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of fuel; c20: wholesale trade and commission trade, except of
motor vehicles and motorcycles; c21: retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of household goods; c22: hotels and restaurants; c23:
inland transport; c24: water transport; c25: air transport; c26: other supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies; c27: post and
telecommunications; c28: financial intermediation; c29: real estate activities; c30: renting of M&Eq. and other business activities; c31: public admin and
defence; compulsory social security; c32: education; c33: health and social work; c34: other community, social, and personal services; c35: private
households with employed persons.
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focus on the exports of final products from c14 was environmen-
tally rather damaging.
An important penalty (37 Mt CO2) is also found for the same
sector for the USA, followed for this country by manufacturing
Nec (c16, a penalty of 13 Mt CO2) which is not a sector with a
particularly high absolute value of ERA for the USA. Other
Chinese industries with large outcomes are: textiles products (c4,
penalty of 28 Mt CO2), basic and fabricated metals (c12, penalty
of 7 Mt CO2), and manufacturing, Nec (c16, penalty of 6 Mt
CO2). Interestingly, none of these accounts are among the highest
ERAs for China. On the contrary, the clear-cut highest ERAs were
for construction (c18) and machinery, Nec (c13), which had a
penalty and a credit of 1 Mt CO2, respectively. For other
countries, high penalties are found also for the sector manu-
facturing, Nec (c16) in India (penalty of 14 Mt CO2) and the
RoW (penalty of 12 Mt CO2), while an important credit (of 29 Mt
CO2) for the RoW in water transport (c24).
These findings highlight the importance of industry detail for
this type of analyses and for policy implementation. It is relevant
to know which industries export many final products (but the
framework can be extended to intermediate products) and how
many global emissions they embody. This information may be
used as a guide in developing a trade strategy that reduces global
emissions. Of course, also other considerations matter when
deciding about trade. For example, full allocation of responsi-
bilities to consumers may imply financial problems in some
industries16. For certain questions and topics also regional detail
is of crucial importance. For instance, quantifying the effects of
trade among developing nations17.
Further visual analyses on deviations across countries/sectors/
time, and sensitivity analyses illustrating possible uncertainties
involved are shown in Supplementary Note 5.
Discussion
In recent years, global multi-regional IO (GMRIO) tables and
corresponding IO models are increasingly used to account
emissions and their trade, helping to design or improve climate
policy. Examples include accounting carbon footprints18,19,
computing balances of avoided emissions20,21, or finding the
drivers of changes in global GHG emissions22.
Starting from emission multipliers, we adapted Ricardian trade
theory. Countries specialize in and export the goods and services
that they produce relatively the cleanest. This allowed us to
answer ex post the question how much global emissions each
country reduced through its trade, which was translated into a
scheme of credits and penalties. Adapting the responsibilities
from the CBA approach with the credits and penalties resulted in
the ERAs. The scheme of credits and penalties satisfies the criteria
of sensitivity, monotonicity, and additivity (three desired prop-
erties)4. Earlier adaptations of CBA (i.e., TCBA4 and TCBA*5)
did not meet the condition of monotonicity.
In past agreements on emissions and climate policies, the role of
credits/penalties was central. The Kyoto Protocol provided three
mechanisms meant to help countries control their emissions
through flexible arrangements23. First, the Clean Development
Mechanism allowed industrialized countries to invest in climate-
friendly projects in poor countries for which they earned carbon
credits (Certified Emission Reductions). Second, the Joint Imple-
mentation mechanism enabled industrialized countries to invest in
climate-friendly projects in other industrialized countries for which
they received another type of carbon credits (Emission Reduction
Units). Third, the trade in emissions created a market for trading
carbon credits. For example, countries that passed their target could
buy carbon credits. This led to pricing systems, such as cap-and-
trade in the EU emissions trading system23.
It is likely that credits and penalties will remain important also
in the future. The COP21 redefined the framework for designing
climate policies. The agreement has been analyzed thoroughly and
the studies on the implications are numerous and diverse24–29.
Some clear messages were given and climate proposals need a
boost to keep warming well <2 °C (ref. 30). The COP21 also
concluded to replace existing market mechanisms by a new one
after 2020. Article 6 of the agreement assumes that countries will
develop internal markets and it says that countries can trade
ITMOs to reach the targets they have set in their nationally
determined contributions (NDCs).
Many scientists, observers, and governments have been calling
for some time for this idea of countries working together to
reduce emissions. ITMOs should be designed to deliver an overall
mitigation impact. That is, a net mitigation impact rather than
purely an offsetting mechanism as conceived under the Kyoto
Protocol. International trading of certificates or ITMOs is only
possible when the rules for accounting the achieved emission
reductions are clearly agreed upon and double counting of cer-
tificates is avoided31. This requires a robust accounting system
that is generally agreed upon. Typically, arriving at such an
agreement is a challenge. However, when the consumer per-
spective is adopted, most of the methodical issues have been
solved32,33, which leaves the choice of a database and the aggre-
gation level to agree upon. ERAs use the same type of information
and methodology as the CBA approach. ERAs are thus well suited
to evaluate the ITMOs in terms of global mitigation impact. Also,
political leaders have agreed to a global, net decarbonization of
human activities before 2100. For this and for other objectives,
ERAs may play an important role in the evaluation of the
expected and real trajectories of national and global emissions.
PBA and CBA will remain very valuable tools to assess these
trajectories from the producer and consumer perspective. PBA
provides the information that is used as an input for CBA, TCBA,
and ERA. Nevertheless, more researchers and policy makers are
looking for different tools that help to develop more effective
national and global climate policies, by fully accounting for
international trade. ERAs may prove helpful since schemes for
credits and penalties should be developed for emissions across all
countries to fully account for trade in emissions. For example, the
Climate Change Act of Scotland34 not only aims to account for
PBA emissions but also CBA. The reduction of global GHG
emissions could well be based on and valued in terms of the
effectiveness of national and international actions as measured
by ERAs.
So far, we have focused on the ex post features of ERAs, trying
to emphasize how ERAs may be used to assess previous and
current agreements. However, ERAs may also lead to ex ante
suggestions to guide trade policy, providing the right signals
toward reducing emissions. Ultimately, they can indicate what
countries should do in terms of choosing/prioritizing actions that
lead to more global emissions reductions (e.g., with a certain
partner or with a bilateral agreement). This seems particularly
relevant in the context of the Paris Agreement11 (Decision
paragraph 20 and Article 14), which requires tracking the pro-
gress of individual and collective contributions every 5 years35.
ERA adapts CBA. Most of the advantages and disadvantages of
CBA hold therefore also for ERA. The advantages that are typi-
cally brought forward include: political benefits, more equity, and
justice36–38, and providing a basis for border carbon taxes or
adjustments39. Disadvantages of CBA, and implementations of
the corresponding taxes and adjustments include concerns about
effectiveness and efficiency, impediments of practical imple-
mentation, or political incompatibility33.
We agree with some points of critique on CBA, e.g., the current
limits to obtain fully tractable information—such as emission
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multipliers—for specific products. However, we also think that
other points of critique can be solved or reduced, and that CBA-
based methods have potential to improve climate policy. For
example, CBA was has been criticized by arguing that it does not
necessarily provide a direct link between a country’s actions and
changes in emissions40. This is precisely an issue that is addressed
and remedied with ERA.
Also, some points of critique do not only apply to CBA, e.g.,
concerns about the link between border carbon taxes or adjust-
ments and the effects on emissions are concerns that apply to any
tax. These concerns are very valid but relate to unavoidable limits,
such as our incapability of predicting the future with certainty.
ERA provides the key elements to analyze scenarios ex ante and
to evaluate the effects ex post. Further points of critique are
related to compiling the data and taking modeling decisions (e.g.,
on the regional and sectoral disaggregation). These points are
related to the reliability and transparency of information. How-
ever, as we argue next, important improvements have occurred in
this respect.
The implementation of CBA and ERA requires GMRIO data
linked to emission data at the same detail level. For a long time,
global and comparable (notably across time) data, at a policy-
relevant level of aggregation of industries and products, were
lacking. At the same time, there are the usual limitations of IO
models, such as the assumption that one industry produces
exactly one product implying that secondary products just do not
exist41–44. Also specific limitations of IO analysis exist for emis-
sion accounting. Examples are: the consequences of biases due to
the aggregation of products and countries; the misalignment of
IO tables with energy-emission methodologies and accounts; or
the treatment of the transport sector and the valuation therein.
In recent years, however, more datasets have become available.
Although IO analysis originates from the field of economics, it is
noteworthy that the first global IO databases were developed in
the environmental sciences. Such databases are now gathered and
updated in a consistent and timely manner (WIOD14, EXIO-
BASE45–47, EORA48, OECD49, and GTAP50,51), given their own
underlying philosophies52. These databases allow for more cross-
country and temporal comparisons of the changes in GHG
emissions17,22,53. Furthermore, it has been showed that the main
results converged across GMRIOs for carbon footprint account-
ing and disparities were basically due to different definitions of
the environmental stressor used19 (also the differences between
GMRIOs have been analyzed54). We expect more studies that:
compare (or simulate, or estimate) projected energy and emission
mitigation pathways over time;7 assess—as required in the Paris
Agreement—the compliance with (or deviations from) the
national targets (NDCs); and value the ITMOs, and national and
global objectives and projections. ERAs and the underlying
scheme of credits and penalties can be very useful for these
studies.
ERAs or a similar system of credits and penalties may not be
implemented in the very short run, but it certainly seems a viable
option for the not so distant future. In the same fashion that a
supranational institution like the OECD started to produce
GMRIO tables, there are interesting movements into the direction
of generalizing accounting systems. For example, OECD and
WTO joining forces in their initiatives to measure trade in value
added or TiVA55. Another example is the Project Réunion, in
which a group of researchers (representing the existing GMRIO
datasets) met to discuss the way forward, which was an important
incentive for forming the virtual MRIO labs52,56.
Convergence of GMRIO tables19,54 suggests two options for
researchers and policy makers. On the one hand, if the results
with separate datasets do not differ very much, one may safely
work with average results. On the other hand, a supranational
institution (e.g., the UNFCCC) may decide to pick a single
database, and require that it is used for tracking the developments
and evaluate the policies. This tracking and evaluating is con-
sidered a must by many authors and was incorporated in the
Paris Agreement. It is also where ERAs may prove to be useful.
In the discussion on (shared) producer/consumer responsi-
bilities, many authors emphasized that both perspectives need to
be considered38. We have chosen to have ERA adapt CBA. First,
because CBA adapts PBA by taking trade and global emissions
into consideration. Second, because ERA includes the next step by
taking account of different trading possibilities and incentivizing
to trade better or smarter. Supplementary Note 4, however, shows
how a scheme of credits and penalties can be developed in a
framework of shared responsibilities. Further developments could
consider modified forms of the consumer perspective approach,
e.g., incorporating capital stock changes57, or based on MNE
foreign affiliates’ responsibility58.
Several authors view implementation and strengthening of the
Paris Agreement as next steps in the global response to climate
change59. Any international negotiation about assigning burdens
(or distributing efforts, or sharing responsibilities) will be domi-
nated by basic considerations60,61. These include criteria for
equity and fairness, historical responsibilities, and the countries’
capacity to pay. The role for ERA would—in our view—be to
complement these basic considerations and do what it does best,
quantifying the environmental effects of recent past or projected
future developments.
Methods
Standard emission accounting methods. This section presents the standard PBA
and CBA, TCBA (proposed by Kander et al.4) and TCBA* (TCBA with the
modification proposed by Domingos et al.5, implemented in Kander et al.62).
Supplementary Note 1 of the SI gives the full methodological framework for PBA,
CBA, TCBA, TCBA*, and ERA. Here, we only present the main equations.
If one aims at reducing global emissions, one would like to develop a scheme to
credit actions by one or more countries that reduce global emissions and penalize
actions that increase global emissions. It is well known that CBA does not satisfy in
this respect and sends out perverse stimuli. This led Kander et al.4 to adjust the
original CBA and remedy this shortcoming. The example in Supplementary Note 2
of the SI shows, however, that also TCBA and TCBA* may penalize a country that
engages in trade that reduces global emissions.
The emission intensities gRi give the emissions per unit (e.g., dollar) of
production in industry i (=1, …, n) of country R (=1, …, N). The element lRSij of
the Nn ×Nn matrix L gives the production in industry i of country R that is
necessary for one dollar of consumer demand for final product j produced in
country S. The emission multiplier is given by
P
R
P
i g
R
i l
RS
ij and tells how much is
emitted globally for one dollar of consumer demand for final product j produced in
country S.
The PBA (minus the emissions directly by households) for country R is given by
PBAR ¼
X
i
gRi x
R
i ¼
X
i
gRi
X
T
xRTi
 !
ð1Þ
where xRi gives the production in industry i of country R and x
RT
i gives the
production in industry i of country R that is embodied in all consumer demand in
country T for final products. The CBA (minus the emissions directly by
households) is for country R given by
CBAR ¼
X
T
X
i
gTi x
TR
i ¼ PBAR 
X
T≠R
X
i
gRi x
RT
i þ
X
T≠R
X
i
gTi x
TR
i ð2Þ
CBA equals PBA minus the export of domestic emissions plus the import of
foreign emissions. For the TCBA, the domestic emission coefficients (gRi ) are
replaced in the exports of emissions by world market average emission coefficients
(gi), with
gi ¼
P
S
P
T≠S g
S
i x
ST
i
 
P
S
P
T≠S x
ST
i
  ð3Þ
This yields
TCBAR ¼ PBAR 
X
T≠R
X
i
gix
RT
i þ
X
T≠R
X
i
gTi x
TR
i ð4Þ
Domingos et al.5 propose to also apply the world market average coefficients in Eq.
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(3) to the imports. In that case, the adapted TCBA becomes
TCBAð ÞR¼ PBAR 
X
T≠R
X
i
gix
RT
i þ
X
T≠R
X
i
gix
TR
i ð5Þ
Emission responsibility allotments. The example in Supplementary Note 2 of the
SI shows that CBA and its adjustments TCBA and TCBA* suffer challenges as
basis for a scheme of credits and penalties. The example considers a situation of
pure Ricardian trade (with comparative advantage defined in terms of emitting the
least CO2) and finds that one of the trading partners is penalized while trade
reduces global emissions. Therefore, we need an adapted framework and for this we
propose to use the ERAs. If the aim is to reduce global emissions then any action
(such as additional trade) that decreases (increases) emissions should be credited
(penalized). Moreover, the larger the reduction in emissions the larger the credits.
ERAs adapt CBA on the basis of the gains and losses for global emissions. The
situation where the traded goods had been produced at home is used as a
benchmark. Next, we present the method to determine ERAs after which we dis-
cuss desirable properties imposed on schemes of credits and penalties in section 3.
For ERAs, we start with the global emissions that are embodied in the final
goods that are produced in R and consumed (or used as investments) in country S.
This is to be compared with the case where the exports of emissions had not taken
place. Instead, all final goods are assumed to have been produced at home in
country S.
The situations to be compared are: first, the actual situation where country S
buys its final products (for consumption and investment purposes) in country R;
and, second, the hypothetical case in which country S had produced these final
products at home. It should be stressed that the counterfactual only affects the
trade in final products. In principle one could extend the analysis to include also
the trade in intermediates. That is, instead of buying intermediates in country R,
produce them at home in country S.
The central idea in Ricardian theory is that a country should export the goods
and services in which it is best in terms of production. This holds, even if it is
always worse than its trading partner. If countries trade in this way they both will
gain from trade. Best is defined as using the least amount of the scarce resource
under consideration. Traditionally, that was labor and more trade leads to
increased welfare in both countries. Alternatively, however, one could take
environmental aspects into consideration. For example, define best as generating
the least amount of emissions in the production of a certain good or service63, or
using the least amount of water64. In that case, increased trade will reduce the
emissions (or water consumption) in each of the two trading countries.
Final consumers (and clients in general) are a powerful force in persuading
producers to act in a responsible way, as witnessed by the growing literature on
corporate social responsibility. This also applies to their responsibility for the
environment. Despite the problem of having constraints in MRIO on compilation
product-specific data that might require time to see great accuracy and detail,
through labeling, consumers can be informed how much CO2 or GHGs are
embodied in a certain final product. If the consumers’ environmental concern is
sufficiently large they may decide not to buy the cheapest alternative but the
alternative that is produced the cleanest. Something similar has happened before
with campaigns aiming to ban brands that sell final products embodying child
labor65,66. According to Ballet et al.67: “the basic strategy for the fight against child
labor has been boycotting efforts followed by labeling practices”.
Bearing the role of consumers in mind, we have chosen to develop ERAs for the
case of trade in final products. Yet, Supplementary Note 4, however, shows what
the framework looks like if we develop a scheme of credits and penalties based on
trade in intermediate products. This would directly incentivize producers to trade
better.
Our scheme of assigning credits and penalties is based on the idea that it takes
two to tango. Both countries are credited (penalized) equally if their bilateral trade
decreases (increases) global emissions. The amount of the credit or penalty is
determined by comparing the actual situation with the hypothetical situation that
imports of emissions had been replaced by emissions at home. Consider two
countries: R and S. Let eRi indicate the emission multiplier, i.e., the global emissions
that are generated somewhere in the production chain of one unit (say dollar) of
final demand for good i from country R. Let yRSi indicate the final demand in
country S for good i from country R. The global emissions involved in the imports
by S of final goods from R are given by
P
i e
R
i y
RS
i . This is to be compared with the
hypothetical situation in which these imports (by S from R) had been produced at
home (i.e., in S). In that case, the global emissions would have been
P
i e
S
i y
RS
i . If the
difference
P
iðeRi  eSi ÞyRSi is negative (positive), it gives the reduction (increase) in
global emissions and reflects the gains (losses) from the exports from R to S. Vice
versa, the imports by R from S (which are equal to the exports from S to R) changes
global emissions by
P
iðeSi  eRi ÞySRi . The extra emissions due to bilateral trade are
given by X
i
eRi  eSi
 
yRSi  ySRi
 
ð6Þ
and a negative outcome indicates reduction of global emissions.
Note that the gains and losses above were derived from the viewpoint of country
R. That is, exports from R (to S) and imports by R (from S). The same answer is
obtained if the calculation is done from the viewpoint of country S, implying
symmetry. We thus assign half of the gains or losses, i.e.,
ð1=2ÞPiðeRi  eSi ÞðyRSi  ySRi Þ, to each of the two countries. The outcome points at
a credit if it is negative and a penalty if it is positive. In the case of N countries, the
changes in global emissions due to trade by country R are given by
ð1=2Þ
X
S
X
i
eRi  eSi
 
yRSi  ySRi
 
ð7:Þ
It should be stressed that the outcomes are particularly relevant when their
development over time is considered. The numbers themselves involve a
comparison of the actual situation with a hypothetical no-trade case. Comparing
the numbers over time, however, allows to analyze the effect of changes in trade
(next to changes in emission efficiency and production technology).
A final adaptation makes the scheme satisfy the condition of additivity. The
extra emissions due to bilateral trade between R and S are given byP
i e
R
i  eSi
 
yRSi  ySRi
 
and ð1=2ÞPiðeRi  eSi ÞðyRSi  ySRi Þ is assigned to each of
the two countries. The average extra global emissions due to bilateral trade are
given by
a ¼ ð1=2Þ
X
R
X
S
X
i
eRi  eSi
 
yRSi  ySRi
 " #
=N ð8Þ
as there are N countries. For country R, instead of using CBAR ¼PSPi eSi ySRi , we
propose to use the ERA defined as
ERAR ¼ CBAR þ ð1=2Þ
X
S
X
i
eRi  eSi
 
yRSi  ySRi
  a ð9Þ
where the penalty is given by ð1=2ÞPSPiðeRi  eSi ÞðyRSi  ySRi Þ  a. Equation (9)
shows that country R is credited if its trade leads to a reduction of the global
emissions that is larger than the average reduction due to trade. In that case is the
penalty negative and do we have ERAR < CBAR. Our scheme of credits and
penalties (as follows directly from ERA) is based on the gains in global emissions
due to the trade in final products by country R (relative to the average country’s
gains in global emissions). As we will discuss in section 3, the scheme of credits and
penalties satisfies all three desirable properties mentioned in Kander et al.4.
In the Supplementary Note 1 (subsection 1.4) of the SI, we provide an
illustration of the functioning of the method for three countries and two goods. We
also extend the method to the industry level, which is illustrated in subsection 1.5
of Supplementary Note 1 in the SI.
Desirable properties for credits and penalties. Kander et al.4 formulate three
important and intuitively compelling properties for a scheme of credits and
penalties. These three properties are a subset of the six properties listed in
Rodrigues et al.6 and Domingos et al.5, albeit using a different terminology. The
three properties in are4: sensitivity, monotonicity, and additivity. The additional
three properties are6: economic causality, symmetry, and scale invariance. In our
discussion, we start with the three properties and show that ERAs satisfy these
properties. After that we indicate why economic causality and symmetry are not
relevant in the present context. We also discuss why the requirement of scale
invariance, which was at the heart of the comment by Domingos et al.5, is not met
by CBA, TCBA (nor indeed TCBA*), and ERA and why it may not be so desirable.
The first property, i.e., sensitivity, means that the credits and penalties are
“responsive to factors that nations can influence” (Kander et al.4). Typical examples
of such factors are: changes in final demands (not only levels but also the
composition of the bundle) that decrease global emissions; decreases in emission
intensities; and changes in the production structure (e.g., a larger productivity in
the sense of using less intermediate inputs per unit of output, or replacing the
import of intermediate inputs from a dirty country by imports from a clean
country). Supplementary Note 3 of the SI provides the technical details and shows
that ERAs are sensitive in the sense that they are responsive to factors that a
country can influence and that affect global emissions.
The second property, i.e., monotonicity, states that a country should not be able to
reduce its own carbon responsibility by increasing global emissions4. So, a country
should not be credited for actions that increase global emissions or penalized for
actions that reduce global emissions. This is a very strict definition, using increases
and decreases in absolute terms. ERAs and the underlying scheme of credits and
penalties do not satisfy this property. However, they are constructed to satisfy a
slightly weaker form of monotonicity that uses changes in global emissions in relative
terms. Countries are credited (or penalized) if their national actions reduce global
emissions more (or increase them less) than average. Also, the larger the reduction in
global emissions the larger the credit (or the smaller the penalty).
The third property is additivity and requires that “the sum of national emissions
for all countries should equal total global emissions” (Kander et al.4). Recall that
Eq. (8) introduced the average extra global emissions due to bilateral trade. The
ERAs in Eq. (9) corrected the CBA for a reduction in global emissions due to trade
that is larger than the average reduction due to trade. The initial set of credits and
penalties was rescaled to make the sum of all responsibilities equal to the global
emissions. This led to additivity.
When discussing the three additional properties (economic causality, symmetry,
and scale invariance), it should be emphasized that the approach in Rodrigues et al.6 is
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slightly different. For any economic flow, they distinguish between its upstream and
its downstream environmental pressure. Gallego and Lenzen3 provided a
comprehensive framework on the upstream and downstream perspectives68. CBA
(and TCBA and ERA) only considers an upstream perspective and simply has no
downstream perspective. Economic causality requires a proportional link between the
upstream and downstream environmental pressure and an economic flow. Symmetry
requires that the upstream environmental pressure of flow (i, j) equals the
downstream pressure of flow (j, i). Given the different viewpoint on (re)distributing
environmental pressures and the role of distinguishing between upstream and
downstream pressures, neither economic causality nor symmetry is relevant in the
present context (with only an upstream perspective).
It should be mentioned that a different type of symmetry does apply in the case
of ERAs. That is, the gains and losses (in terms of changes in global emissions) of
bilateral trade between countries R and S, are the same no matter whether they are
evaluated from the perspective of R or of S. Both perspectives yield the same
answer. The credit or penalty that follows from the gain or loss is the same for both
trading partners if they share the consequences equally.
In the comment by Domingos et al.5 and the response by Kander et al.62, the
focus is on the last of the remaining properties, namely scale invariance. It means
that, for any union of countries, the sum of emission responsibilities for all
countries in the union must equal the emission responsibility of the union if it were
treated as a single country. Domingos et al.5 argue that TCBA does not satisfy the
scale invariance condition and come up with an alternative.
We argue that CBA, TCBA, but also the method proposed by5 and our own
ERA do not satisfy scale invariance. The reason is that any method in IO analysis
that is based on the Leontief inverse suffers from aggregation bias. The
underlying idea is as follows. At the aggregate level, one may provide two
answers to a single question. One answer is obtained from aggregation after
calculation, the other answer from calculation after aggregation. Suppose we
have a large GMRIO table and suppose that a number of individual countries
form a union (like EU27 in the WIOD tables). In the case of aggregation after
calculation, we first calculate the answer using the full GMRIO table and then
aggregate the answers for the individual countries in the union to arrive at the
answer for the union. In the case of calculation after aggregation, we first
aggregate the GMRIO table to arrive at a smaller table that includes the union as
if it were a single country. Next, we run the calculations on this aggregated table
that yields answers for individual countries, one of which represents the union.
These two types of calculation yield the same answer only under very strong
properties that do not hold in real world cases, or by sheer coincidence41. In
general, the answers will differ and the difference is termed aggregation bias.
Because the Leontief inverse L is a non-linear function of the input matrix A
(L ¼ ðI AÞ1 ¼ Iþ Aþ A2 þ ¼ ), questions for which the answer involves
the use of L suffer from aggregation bias. This raises the question whether scale
invariance is such a desirable property. If it is, the accounting framework cannot
be based on the IO model, because this model uses L that makes the framework
scale variant. PBA is an example of an accounting framework that satisfies the
condition of scale invariance (and that—indeed—does not use an IO model).
Reporting summary. Further information on research design is available in
the Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
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